Formal analysis of security protocols based on symbolic models has been very successful in finding flaws in published protocols and proving protocols secure, using automated tools. An important question is whether this kind of formal analysis implies security guarantees in the strong sense of modern cryptography. Initiated by the seminal work of Abadi and Rogaway, this question has been investigated and numerous positive results showing this so-called computational soundness of formal analysis have been obtained. However, for the case of active adversaries and protocols that use symmetric encryption computational soundness has remained a challenge.
INTRODUCTION
Formal analysis of security protocols based on symbolic models, also called Dolev-Yao models [21] , has been very successful in finding flaws in published protocols and proving protocols secure, using fully automated or interactive tools (see, e.g., [30, 7, 8, 3, 9, 24] ). While formal analysis in symbolic models is appealing due to its relative simplicity and rich tool support (ranging from finite state model checking, over fully or semi-automatic special purpose tools, to general purpose theorem provers), an important question is whether analysis results obtained in the symbolic model carry over to the realm of modern cryptography with its strong security notions. Initiated by the seminal work of Abadi and Rogaway [2] , this so-called computational soundness problem has attracted a lot of attention in the last few years and many positive results have been obtained (see, e.g., [2, 31, 18, 17, 22] ).
However, as further discussed in Section 9, establishing computational soundness results for protocols with symmetric encryption in presence of active adversaries has turned out to be non-trivial. Most results for symmetric encryption assume passive or at most adaptive adversaries (see, e.g., [2, 22] ). Conversely, results for active adversaries mostly consider asymmetric cryptography, e.g., public-key encryption and digital signatures (see, e.g., [31, 18, 17, 14] ). One reason that the combination of symmetric encryption and active adversaries in computational soundness results is challenging is that, unlike private keys in asymmetric settings, symmetric keys may "travel" between parties and some of these keys may be dishonestly generated by the adversary. The behavior of encryption and decryption under dishonestly generated keys is almost arbitrary, and hence, hard to map to the symbolic settings, as cryptographic definitions do not consider dishonestly generated keys.
The goal of this work is therefore to obtain computational soundness results for protocols that use symmetric keys in presence of active adversaries, with standard cryptographic assumptions. More precisely, the contribution of this paper is as follows.
Contribution of this Paper. We first propose a class of symbolic key exchange protocols based on the applied pi calculus [1] , with pairing, symmetric encryption, and nonces as well as branching via general if-then-else statements. These symbolic protocols are given an obvious computational interpretation, with, compared to other works, only very mild tagging requirements; basically, only pairs and keys are tagged. In particular, we do not require ciphertexts to carry any auxiliary information. We use the IITM model [23] , a model for simulation-based security, as our computational model. This model is close in spirit to Canetti's UC model [12] . However, as further discussed in Section 4, due to some technical problems in the UC model, the IITM model is more suitable for our purposes.
For the main result of the paper, the computational soundness result, we develop a natural symbolic criterion for key exchange protocols. This criterion requires i) that a symbolic key exchange protocol is observationally equivalent [1] to its randomized version in which instead of the actual session key a freshly generated key is output and ii) that all keys used within one session of the key exchange protocol remain secret in case the session is uncorrupted. The first condition is the natural symbolic counterpart of cryptographic key indistinguishability. The second condition also seems well justified from an intuitive point of view: It is hard to imagine a reasonable key exchange protocol where in an uncorrupted session the keys used in the session become known to the adversary. This second condition will enable us, unlike other work (see Section 9) , to deal with dishonestly generated keys. We note that the symbolic criterion only talks about one session of a protocol. Hence, it is particularly simple to check by automatic tools, e.g., [9, 11] (see also [6] for related decidability results).
The main result of the paper is that if a symbolic key exchange protocol satisfies our symbolic criterion, then this protocol (more precisely, the computational interpretation of this protocol), realizes a key exchange functionality in the sense of universal composability [12, 23] . This is a very strong security guarantee. It a priori only talks about one session of the protocol, but the composition theorems of simulation-based security [12, 23] imply that polynomially many concurrent copies of this protocol can be used securely as key exchange protocols in every (probabilistic polynomial-time) environment. While the composition theorems assume independent copies of protocols, a joint state theorem for symmetric encryption with long-term keys [26] can be employed to obtain an implementation where longterm keys are shared across sessions. Our computational soundness result works for any symmetric encryption scheme that guarantees (standard) authenticated encryption, i.e., IND-CPA and INT-CTXT security.
To obtain our computational soundness result, we first prove it for the case where symmetric encryption is performed based on an ideal functionality for symmetric encryption with short-and long-term keys, as proposed in [26] . We then, using the composition theorem, replace this functionality by its realization. This last step requires that the protocol does not produce key-cycles and does not cause the so-called commitment problem (see Section 5) . We propose symbolic, automatically checkable criteria for these properties. We note that the mentioned ideal functionality in [26] also supports public-key encryption. Therefore it should be easy to extend the results presented in this paper to protocols that use both symmetric and public-key encryption.
Structure of this Paper. In Section 2, we recall the applied pi calculus. The class of symbolic key exchange protocols that we consider is introduced in Section 3. The computational model, i.e., the IITM model, is presented in Section 4. The mentioned ideal functionalities that we use are discussed in Section 5. The computational interpretation of the symbolic protocol is then introduced in Section 6. The main result is presented in Section 7, with the proof sketched in Section 8. We conclude with a discussion on related work in Section 9. Full definitions and proofs can be found in our technical report [27] .
THE SYMBOLIC MODEL
Our symbolic model is an instance of the applied π-calculus [1] , similar to the one in [15] .
Syntax
Let Σ be a finite set of function symbols, the signature. The set of terms T (N , X ) over Σ and infinite sets N and X of names and variables, respectively, is defined as usual. The set of ground terms, i.e., terms without variables, is T (N ) . In what follows, s, t, . . . and x, y, z denote terms and variables, respectively. We use α, β, . . . to denote metavariables that range over variables and names.
In this paper, we consider the signature Σ = { ·, · , π1(·), π2(·), {·} · · , dec(·, ·), sk(·)}, where, as usual, t1, t2 is the pairing of the terms t1 and t2, π1(t) and π2(t) are the projections to the first and second component of t (in case t is a pair), respectively, {t} r k stands for the ciphertext obtained by encrypting t under the key k using randomness r, dec(t, k) is the plaintext obtained by decrypting t with k (in case t is a ciphertext under k), and sk(k) is used to tag symmetric keys. Accordingly, Σ is associated with the following equational theory E: π1( x, y ) = x, π2( x, y ) = y, dec({x} z y , y) = x. We denote by =E the congruence relation on terms induced by E. We say that a term t is reduced or in normal form, if it is not possible to apply one of the above equations from left to right. Obviously, every term has a unique normal form. For example, for tex = dec(π2( a, {b} r sk(k) ), sk(k)) we have that tex =E b which is its normal form.
We also consider the following predicate symbols over ground terms, which may be used in if-then-else statements in processes:
1. M is a unary predicate such that M (t) is true iff the normal form of t does not contain π1(·), π2(·), and dec(·, ·), and for every subterm of t of the form {t1}
, there exists t 2 such that t2 =E sk(t 2 ).
2. EQ is a binary predicate such that EQ(s, t) is true iff s =E t, M (s), and M (t).
3. Ppair is a unary predicate such that Ppair(t) is true iff t is a pair, i.e., t =E t1, t2 for some terms t1, t2.
4.
Penc is a unary predicate such that Penc(t) is true iff t is a ciphertext, i.e., t =E {t1}
for some terms t1, t2, t3.
5. P key is a unary predicate such that P key (t) is true iff t is a key, i.e., t =E sk(t ) for some term t .
For example, the predicates M (tex) and EQ(tex, b) are true, while M (π1({a} r k )) is false. We remark that the above predicates can be encoded in ProVerif [9, 11] .
We call M (t), EQ(s, t), Ppair(t), Penc(t), P key (t) for terms s and t (possibly with variables) atoms. A condition φ is a Boolean formula over atoms. For example, φ = M (s) ∧ M (t) ∧ ¬EQ(s, t) says that s and t both satisfy the predicate M but are not equivalent modulo E. If φ contains only ground terms, then the truth value of φ is defined in the obvious way. If φ holds true, we write |= φ. Now, (plain) processes P, Q and extended processes A, B are defined in Figure 1 . There should be at most one active substitution for a variable and the set of active substitutions should be cycle-free, e.g., {x → x} is not allowed. Extended processes basically extend plain processes by what is called a frame. A frame ϕ is of the form (νn)σ, where σ denotes a substitution, i.e., a set {x1 → s1, . . . , x l → s l }, and n P, Q ::= c(x).P input | c s .P output A frame can also be considered as a specific extended process where the only plain process is 0. Every extended process A induces a frame ϕ(A) which is obtained from A by replacing every plain process and substitution of restricted variables embedded in A by 0. Intuitively, a frame captures the knowledge of the attacker (who has access to the variables xi), where the restricted names n are a priori not known to the attacker. The domain dom(A) of A is dom(ϕ(A)). By fn(A) and fv(A) we denote the sets of free names and free variables, respectively, in the process A, i.e., the variables and names not bound by a ν or an input command c(x). Note that, for example, x is free in the process {x → s}, while it is bound in (νx){x → s}. We call names that occur free in a process, excluding channel names, global constants. An extended process A is closed if the set fv(A) excluding variables assigned in active substitutions in A is empty. Renaming a bound name or variable into a fresh name or variable, respectively, is called α-conversion. The process A{x → s} is the process A in which free occurrences of x have been replaced by s.
An evaluation context C is an extended process with a hole, i.e., it is of the form (να)([·] A), where A is an extended process. We write
Operational Semantics
To define the semantics of processes it is convenient to first define a structural equivalence relation ≡ of processes, which captures basic properties of the operators, such as commutativity and associativity of (see [27] ). Internal computation steps of a process, i.e., internal communication and evaluation of if-then-else statements, is defined by the internal reduction relation → which is the smallest relation on closed extended processes closed under structural equivalence ≡ and closed under application of evaluation contexts such that the following is true, where φ contains only ground terms:
By → * we denote the reflexive and transitive closure of →. To describe communication of a process with its environment, we use the labeled operational semantics of a process in order to make the interaction with the environment, which typically represents the adversary, visible through labels and frames. The labeled operational semantics is defined by the relation In fact, since labels of the form c t for a term t are not allowed, one is forced to store terms to be output into a frame, hence, make them accessible to the adversary.
− − → An where each Ai is a closed extended process and each ai is either ε (empty label representing an internal action →) or a label as above, with fv(ai) ⊆ dom(Ai−1), for all i ≤ n.
We call B a successor of A if there is a trace from A to B.
Deduction and Static Equivalence
We define terms that an adversary can derive from a frame and the view an adversary has on frames, extended processes, and traces.
Definition 2. We say that a ground term s is deducible from a frame ϕ = (νn)σ (written ϕ s) if σ s can be inferred by the following rules:
1. If there exists x ∈ dom(σ) such that xσ = s or s ∈ N \n, then σ s. 2. If σ si for i ≤ l and f ∈ Σ, then σ f (s1, . . . , s l ). 3. If σ s and s =E s , then σ s .
Let ϕ be a frame, p be a predicate (i.e., M , EQ, Ppair, Penc, or P key ), and s1, . . . , s l be terms. We write ϕ |= p(s1, . . . , s l ) if there exists n and σ such that ϕ ≡ (νn)σ, fn(si) ∩ n = ∅ for all i ≤ l, and |= p(s1, . . . , s l )σ. For example, consider the frame ϕex = (νn){x1 → b, x2 → tex, x3 → n}, with tex as above, then ϕex |= EQ(x1, x2), but ϕex |= EQ(x1, x3). Now, as in [15] , static equivalence is defined as follows.
Definition 3. Two frames ϕ and ϕ , are statically equivalent, denoted ϕ ∼s ϕ , if their domains are equal and for all predicates p and terms s1, . . . ,
We now recall the definition of labeled bisimulation, which as shown in [1] , is equivalent to observational equivalence. Intuitively, two process are labeled bisimilar, if an adversary cannot distinguish between them.
Definition 4. Labeled bisimilarity ∼ l is the largest symmetric relation R on closed extended processes such that (A, B) ∈ R implies: 
SYMBOLIC PROTOCOLS
We now define the class of key exchange protocols that we consider, called symbolic protocols. In Section 6, these protocols are given a computational interpretation.
We fix the following names for channels: c Symbolic protocols describe key exchange protocols and will essentially be a parallel composition of certain processes, called symbolic roles. A symbolic role first waits for input, then after performing some checks, by a sequence of if-thenelse statements, produces output. The role may then terminate or wait for new input, and so on. Symbolic roles are defined by the following grammar: . Note that the predicates Ppair, Penc, and P key may not be used by principles. However, they may be used by the adversary to enhance his power to distinguish processes. The reason for writing true and false on the network in if-then-else statements is that for our computational soundness result to hold, a symbolic adversary should be able to tell whether conditions in if-then-else statements are evaluated to true or to false. In other words, we force observationally different behavior for then-and else-branches of if-then-else statements. In protocol specifications thenand else-branches would in most cases exhibit observationally different behavior anyway: For example, if in the elsebranch the protocol terminates but in the if-branch the protocol is continued, then this is typically observable by the adversary. Now, a symbolic protocol is essentially a parallel composition of symbolic roles, specifying one session of a key exchange protocol. For example, in a key exchange protocol with an initiator, responder, and key distribution server, symbolic roles R1, R2, and R3 would describe the behavior of these three entities, respectively. Initially, a symbolic protocol expects to receive the names of the parties involved in the protocol session. In the example, these names would be stored in the variables x1, x2, and x3, respectively.
Formally, a symbolic (key exchange) protocol Π is a tuple Π = (P, R, N lt , Nst, N rand , Nnonce), with
where R ⊆ {x1, . . . , x l }, n is the disjoint union of the sets of names N lt (long-term keys), Nst (short-term keys), N rand (randomness for encryption), and Nnonce (nonces). As mentioned, Ri, i ≤ l, are symbolic roles. We require that P is closed, i.e., the variables x1, . . . , x l are the only free variables in Ri, and Ri uses the channel names c , respectively, so that the adversary can easily interact with every single role. Other channel names are not used by Ri and the set n may not contain channel names or the special names ⊥, true, false. For simplicity, we assume that all bound names and variables in P that occur in different contexts have different names (by α-conversion, this is w.l.o.g.). We often do not distinguish between Π and P.
The set R contains the (names of the) "main roles" of a protocol session, i.e., those roles that want to exchange a session key. We require |R| = 2 because we consider two party key exchange; however, this restriction could easily be lifted. For example, R would contain the initiator and responder, but not the key distribution server. Only the roles corresponding to some xi ∈ R may output a session key on channel c out,i io . We assume further syntactic restrictions on P in order for P to have a reasonable computational interpretation: Names in Nst, N rand , and Nnonce should only occur in at most one symbolic role, and names in N lt in at most two symbolic roles, as we assume that a long-term key is shared between two parties; however, again, this restriction could easily be lifted. Since fresh randomness should be used for new encryptions, names r in N rand should only occur in at most one subterm and this subterm should be of the form {s} r k . However, this subterm may occur in several places within a symbolic role. The function symbol sk(·) ("symmetric key") is meant to be used as a tag for (short-and long-term) keys. Therefore every n ∈ N lt ∪ Nst should only occur in P in the form sk(n), and sk(·) should not occur in any other form. (Clearly, the adversary will not and cannot be forced to follow this tagging policy.) Long-term keys sk(n), n ∈ N lt , are not meant to travel. These keys should therefore only occur as keys for encryption and decryption in P. For example, a subterm of the form {sk(n)} r k , for n ∈ N lt , is not allowed in P. We note that instead of using sk(·) we could have assumed types for symmetric keys. However, since types are not supported by the tool ProVerif yet, we decided to emulate such types by sk(·).
THE IITM MODEL
In this section, we briefly recall the IITM model for simulation-based security (see [23] for details). In this model, security notions and composition theorems are formalized based on a relatively simple, but expressive general computational model in which IITMs (inexhaustible interactive Turing machines) and systems of IITMs are defined. While being in the spirit of Canetti's UC model [13] , the IITM model has several advantages over the UC model, as demonstrated and discussed in [23, 25] . In particular, as pointed out in [25] , there are problems with joint state theorems in the UC model. Since we employ joint state theorems here, we choose the IITM model as the basis of our work.
The General Computational Model
Our general computational model is defined in terms of systems of IITMs.
An inexhaustible interactive Turing machine (IITM) M is a probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machine with named input and output tapes. The names determine how different IITMs are connected in a system of IITMs. An IITM runs in one of two modes, CheckAddress and Compute. The CheckAddress mode is used as a generic mechanism for addressing copies of IITMs in a system of IITMs, as explained below. The runtime of an IITM may depend on the length of the input received so far and in every activation an IITM may perform a polynomial-time computation; this is why these ITMs are called inexhaustible. However, in this extended abstract we omit the details of the definition of IITMs, as these details are not necessary to be able to follow the rest of the paper.
A system S of IITMs is of the form
where the Mi and M j are IITMs such that the names of input tapes of different IITMs in the system are disjoint. We say that the machines M j are in the scope of a bang operator. This operator indicates that in a run of a system an unbounded number of (fresh) copies of a machine may be generated. Conversely, machines which are not in the scope of a bang operator may not be copied. Systems in which multiple copies of machines may be generated are often needed, e.g., in case of multi-party protocols or in case a system describes the concurrent execution of multiple instances of a protocol.
In a run of a system S at any time only one IITM is active and all other IITMs wait for new input; the first IITM to be activated in a run of S is the so-called master IITM, of which a system has at most one. To illustrate runs of systems, consider, for example, the system S = M1 | !M2 and assume that M1 has an output tape named c, M2 has an input tape named c, and M1 is the master IITM. (There maybe other tapes connecting M1 and M2.) Assume that in the run of S executed so far, two copies of M2, say M 2 and M 2 , have been generated, in this order, and that M1 just sent a message m on tape c. This message is delivered to a copy of M2, since M2 has an input tape named c. The copy of M2 to which m is sent is determined as follows. First, M 2 , the first copy of M2, runs in the CheckAddress mode with input m; this is a deterministic computation which outputs "accept" or "reject". If M 2 accepts m, then M 2 gets to process m and could, for example, send a message back to M1. Otherwise, M 2 , the second copy of M2, is run in CheckAddress mode with input m. If M 2 accepts m, then M 2 gets to process m. Otherwise, a new copy M 2 of M2 with fresh randomness is generated and M 2 runs in CheckAddress mode with input m. If M 2 accepts m, then M 2 gets to process m. Otherwise, if no IITM accepts m, the message m is dropped and the master IITM is activated, in this case M1, and so on. The master IITM is also activated if the currently active IITM does not produce output, i.e., stops in this activation without writing to any output tape. A run stops if the master IITM does not produce output (and hence, does not trigger another machine) or an IITM outputs a message on a tape named decision. Such a message is considered to be the overall output of the system.
We will consider so-called well-formed systems, which satisfy a simple syntactic condition that guarantees polynomial runtime of a system. Two systems P and Q are called indistinguishable (P ≡ Q) iff the difference between the probability that P outputs 1 (on the decision tape) and the probability that Q outputs 1 (on the decision tape) is negligible in the security parameter.
Given an IITM M , we will often use its identifier (ID) version M to be able to address multiple copies of M . The identifier version M of M is an IITM which simulates M within a "wrapper". The wrapper requires that all messages received have to be prefixed by a particular ID, e.g., a session ID (SID) or party ID (PID); other messages will be rejected in the CheckAddress mode. Before giving a message to M , the wrapper strips off the ID. Messages sent out by M are prefixed with this ID by the wrapper. The ID that M will use is the one with which M was first activated. We often refer to M by session version or party version of M if the ID is meant to be a SID or PID, respectively. For example, if M specifies an ideal functionality, then !M denotes the multi-session version of M , i.e., a system with an unbounded number of copies of M where every copy of M can be addresses by an SID. Given a system S, its identifier (ID)
Notions of Simulation-Based Security
We need the following terminology. For a system S, the input/output tapes of IITMs in S that do not have a matching output/input tape are called external. We group these tapes into I/O and network tapes. We consider three different types of systems, modeling i) real and ideal protocols/functionalities, ii) adversaries and simulators, and iii) environments: Protocol systems and environmental systems are systems which have an I/O and network interface, i.e., they may have I/O and network tapes. Adversarial systems only have a network interface. Environmental systems may contain a master IITM. We can now define strong simulatability, other equivalent security notions, such as black-box simulatability and (dummy) UC can be defined in a similar way [23] .
Definition 5. Let P and F be protocol systems with the same I/O interface, the real and the ideal protocol, respectively. Then, P realizes F (P ≤ F) iff there exists an adversarial system S (a simulator) such that the systems P and S | F have the same external interface and for all environmental systems E, connecting only to the external interface of P (and hence, S | F) it holds that E | P ≡ E | S | F.
Composition Theorems
We restate the composition theorems from [23] . The first composition theorem handles concurrent composition of a fixed number of protocol systems. The second one guarantees secure composition of an unbounded number of copies of a protocol system. Theorem 1. Let P1, P2, F1, F2 be protocol systems such that P1 and P2 as well as F1 and F2 only connect via their I/O interfaces, P1 | P2 and F1 | F2 are well-formed, and Pi ≤ Fi, for i ∈ {1, 2}. Then, P1 | P2 ≤ F1 | F2.
Theorem 2. Let P, F be protocol systems such that P ≤ F. Then, !P ≤ !F. (Recall that P and F are the session versions of P and F, respectively.) Theorems 1 and 2 can be applied iteratively, to get more and more complex systems. For example, using that ≤ is reflexive, we obtain as a corollary of the above theorems that P ≤ F implies Q | !P ≤ Q | !F for any protocol system Q, i.e., Q using an unbounded number of copies of P realizes Q using an unbounded number of copies of F.
IDEAL FUNCTIONALITIES
We recall two ideal functionalities that we use in this paper, namely F ke for ideal key exchange and Fenc for ideal symmetric encryption.
The Key Exchange Functionality
We use the key exchange functionality F ke as specified in [14] . This functionality describes one session of an ideal key exchange between two parties. It waits for key exchange requests from the two parties and if the simulator (ideal adversary) sends a message for one party to finish (session finish message), this party receives a session key output (SK-output) message which contains the key generated within F ke , where the key is chosen uniformly at random from {0, 1} η (η is the security parameter). (Of course, other distributions for the session key could be used.) The simulator has the ability to corrupt F ke before the first SKoutput message was sent, i.e., before one party received a key. In this case, upon completion of the key exchange, the simulator may determine the key a party obtains. In other words, an uncorrupted F ke guarantees that the key a party receives upon a key exchange request is a freshly generated key that is only known to the parties involved in the key exchange. The key is indistinguishable from random for an adversary even if the key is output by one party before the end of the protocol. Also, if both parties receive a key, the two keys are guaranteed to coincide. Conversely, a corrupted F ke does not provide security guarantees; the key exchanged between the two parties is determined by the adversary. As usual for functionalities, the environment may ask whether or not F ke has been corrupted.
As mentioned, F ke captures only one key exchange between any two parties. An unbounded number of sessions of key exchanges between arbitrary parties is described by the system !F ke (see also Section 7).
The Symmetric Encryption Functionality
We use the functionality Fenc for ideal authenticated symmetric encryption as specified in [26] . Arbitrary many parties can invoke Fenc via the I/O interface to generate (shortand long-term) symmetric keys and to encrypt and decrypt messages and ciphertexts, respectively, in an ideal way under these keys, where the messages to be encrypted may again contain (short-term) keys. The functionality Fenc can handle an unbounded number of encryption and decryption requests, with messages and ciphertexts being arbitrary bit strings of arbitrary length. In what follows, we provide a more detailed description of Fenc (see [26] for full details).
The functionality Fenc is parameterized by a leakage algorithm L which determines what information about a plaintext may be leaked by the ciphertext. We will use the leakage algorithm L which takes a message m of length at least the security parameter as input and returns a random bit string of the same length as m. In essence, L leaks the length of a message.
As mentioned, the functionality Fenc allows for encryption and decryption with short-and long-term symmetric keys. We first consider the interface of Fenc for short-term keys.
In an initialization phase, encryption and decryption algorithms, enc and dec, respectively, are provided by the simulator.
A party can request Fenc to generate a short-term key upon which the simulator may provide a key and the party obtains a pointer to this key. The key itself is stored in Fenc. When the simulator provides the key, it can decide to corrupt the key, in which case the key is marked corrupted.
To encrypt a message m (an arbitrary bit string) under a short-term key, a party provides Fenc with m and the pointer to the short-term key, say k, under which m shall be encrypted. The message m may contain pointers to other short-term keys. Before m is encrypted these pointers are replaced by the corresponding short-term keys, if any, resulting in a message m . Now, if the short-term key k is marked unknown (see below), m is encrypted ideally, i.e., not m but the leakage L(m ) is encrypted under k with the encryption algorithm enc, resulting in a ciphertext c, say. Hence, by definition of L, only the length of m is leaked. It is also guaranteed that the ciphertext has high entropy, i.e., it can be guessed only with negligible probability. The functionality Fenc stores the pair (m , c). In case k is marked known, not the leakage of m but m itself is encrypted.
To decrypt a ciphertext c (an arbitrary bit string) under a short-term key, a party provides Fenc with c and the pointer to the short-term key, say k. If k is marked unknown, c is decrypted ideally, i.e., it is checked whether there is a pair of the form (m , c) stored in Fenc. In this case, m is returned to the party, where keys in m , if any, are first replaced by pointers; for keys to which the party does not have a pointer yet, new pointers are generated. If Fenc does not contain a pair of the form (m , c), an error message is returned. This models authenticated encryption. In particular, valid ciphertexts for unknown symmetric keys can only be generated within Fenc with the corresponding keys.
The functionality Fenc also allows a party via the I/O interface to import symmetric keys and to ask to reveal keys stored in Fenc using the commands store and reveal, respectively. These keys are marked known in Fenc.
The environment can ask Fenc via the I/O interface about the corruption status of single keys.
It remains to define what it means for a key to be marked unknown. A short-term key is marked unknown if it has not been entered into Fenc by a store command, has not been revealed by a reveal command, has not explicitly been corrupted by the simulator, and has always been encrypted under short-term keys marked unknown or uncorrupted longterm keys (see below).
The functionality Fenc also provides means to establish long-term symmetric keys between parties and to use such keys for symmetric encryption in a similar way as described above. In particular, short-term symmetric keys may be (ideally) encrypted under long-term keys. However, longterm keys itself may not be encrypted. Altogether, this provides a bootstrapping mechanism for short-term key encryption/decryption. In [26] , bootstrapping with public-key encryption is also considered.
It has been proven in [26] that Fenc can be realized in a natural way by an authenticated encryption scheme Σ, i.e., a symmetric encryption scheme that is IND-CPA and INT-CTXT secure; a version of Fenc realizable by IND-CCA2 secure encryption was also considered. In the realization Penc(Σ) (Penc for short) of Fenc ideal encryption and decryption is simply replaced by (real) encryption and decryption according to Σ, no extra randomness or tagging is necessary. However, Penc(Σ) only realizes Fenc in environments that do not generate key cycles or cause the so-called commitment problem. More precisely, environments are required to be used-order respecting and non-committing: We say that an unknown key has been used (for encryption) if Fenc has been instructed to use this key for encryption. Now, an environment is used-order respecting if an unknown key k, i.e., a key marked unknown in Fenc, used for the first time at some point is encrypted itself only by unknown keys that have been used for the first time later than k. An environment is non-committing if an unknown key that has been used does not become known later on. A protocol P that uses Fenc is used-order respecting/non-committing if E | P is used-order respecting/non-committing for any environment E. As argued in [26, 4] , protocols are typically used-order respecting and non-committing. In fact, in most protocols once a key has been used to encrypt a message this key is typically not encrypted anymore in the rest of the protocol. We call such protocols standard protocols. Provided static corruption, such protocols can easily be seen to be used-order respecting and non-committing. Hence, such protocols can be first analyzed using Fenc. Then, by the composition theorem, Fenc can be replaced by its realization Penc.
In [26] also a joint state realization of Fenc is provided, which guarantees that if Fenc is used in multiple sessions, all sessions can use the same long-term symmetric keys.
COMPUTATIONAL INTERPRETATION OF SYMBOLIC PROTOCOLS
In this section, we briefly describe how a symbolic protocol is executed in the IITM model. This is done in the expected way, we highlight only some aspects.
Let P be a symbolic protocol as in Section 3. We assume an injective mapping τ from global constants, i.e., free names in P, to bit strings. Then, the protocol system [|P|] τ of P is a system of IITMs:
The IITMs M1, . . . , M l are the computational interpreta-
. . , R l , respectively, as explained below. The machine M is used to provide the same I/O interface to the environment as F ke and to initialize a session. It connects to the systems M1, . . . , M l , Fenc via the I/O interface. The environment cannot directly communicate with M1, . . . , M l , Fenc via the I/O interface. Similarly to F ke , the machine M expects to receive a request for key exchange, containing the names of the parties involved in the protocol session. Upon the first request, M triggers the machines M1, . . . , M l to initialize themselves: nonces are generated, short-term keys are generated using Fenc, and long-term keys are exchanged, again using Fenc. In the initialization phase the adversary can corrupt keys (via Fenc) or take over machines Mi completely (static corruption). Again similar to F ke , if asked about the corruption status by the environment, M reports this status to the environment: M checks the corruption status of every Mi and every Mi in turn checks the corruption status of the keys it manages. If one Mi or a key is corrupted, the whole session is considered corrupted.
An IITM Mi is derived from its symbolic counterpart Ri in the natural way. It performs most of the communication with the adversary via the network interface. The I/O interface is only used to receive initialization requests and to report the corruption status, as explained above, or to output session keys after successful completion of a session. Encryption and decryption is performed via Fenc. We tag pairs and keys/pointers in such a way that these objects cannot be confused with other objects, and that the components of pairs can be extracted. We do not require tags to distinguish names, nonces, or ciphertexts. The atomic formula M (s) is interpreted as true if the computational interpretation of s does not fail. For example, applying π1 to a bit string that is not a pair would fail. The atomic formula EQ(s1, s2) is interpreted as true if the computational interpretations of s1 and s2 do not fail and yield the same bit strings. The output of the constants true and false after if-then-else statements is not computationally interpreted, i.e., Mi does not produce such outputs but directly continues with the execution after this output. In other words, the adversary is not given a priori knowledge of the internal evaluation of if-then-else statements, although this could be allowed without changing our results.
Let us illustrate the execution of Mi = [|Ri|] τ by the symbolic role Ri = c ,sk(n))) ] . . . else . . ., where n ∈ N lt , n ∈ Nnonce, r ∈ N rand , and a ∈ N is a global constant. In this case, after Mi has finished its initialization, as explained above, Mi first waits for input from the network (the adversary). If Mi receives a message m, say, then, Mi first checks whether the evaluation of π1(dec(x, sk(n))) and a is successful, corresponding to checking M (π1(dec(x, sk(n)))) and M (a). For a, which is τ (a), this is the case. For the former expression, Mi decrypts m (because m is assigned to the input variable x) using Fenc with the long-term key corresponding to sk(n). If this succeeds, this should yield a bit string tagged as a pair; otherwise the evaluation fails, and the else-branch will be executed. Then, extracting the first component of this pair will also succeed. For EQ(π1(dec(x, sk(n))), a) to be true, it remains to check whether this component coincides with τ (a). If this is the case, the then-branch will be executed. For this, c out,i net true is skipped. Then, it is first checked whether the expression s = { n , a } r π 2 (dec(x,sk(n))) can be evaluated successfully, which corresponds to checking M (s). The most critical part here is the evaluation of π2(dec(x, sk(n))). This is done similarly to the case above. The evaluation should yield a pointer of the form (Key, ptr ). This pointer is then used to encrypt, using Fenc, the computational interpretation of n , a . Again, c out,i net true is skipped. The resulting ciphertext is then output on the network.
We note that Mi might receive keys (Key, k) in plaintext or might be asked to output (short-term) keys in clear. Before the actual parsing, such keys are entered into/extracted from Fenc via store and reveal commands. We remark that storing the same key twice returns the same pointer.
Finally, we note that Fenc might "fail", i.e., Fenc returns an error message, upon an encryption or store request. In this case we define Mi to produce empty output and to terminate. See [27] for a discussion of this point.
MAIN RESULT
We now present the main result of our paper. As already mentioned in the introduction, the symbolic criterion for our computational soundness result consists of two parts: i) We assume the symbolic protocol to be labeled bisimilar (observationally equivalent) to its randomized version in which instead of the actual session key a new nonce is output. ii) All keys used within one uncorrupted session of the key exchange protocol remain secret. As mentioned in the introduction, the second condition is a very natural condition to assume for key exchange protocols. Moreover, it will allow us to deal with dishonestly generated keys, which have been problematic in other works (see also Section 9): Intuitively, it implicitly guarantees that keys used by honest principals in a protocol run will be honestly generated.
To formalize the first part of our symbolic criterion, we define the random-world version of a symbolic protocol. The random-world version rand(P) of a symbolic protocol P as in Section 3 is the same as P, except that instead of outputting the actual session key on channel c out io , a random key (i.e., a new nonce) is output. Formally, we define:
where n * is a name that does not occur in P and the process Pn * is obtained from P by replacing "c out,i io s " by "c out,i io n * " for every term s and i ≤ l. The first part of our symbolic criterion will then simply be P ∼ l rand(P). As already mentioned in the introduction, this condition can be checked automatically using existing tools, such as ProVerif [11] .
To formulate the second part of our symbolic criterion, we first extend our signature Σ by the encryption and decryption symbols encsecret(·, ·) and decsecret(·, ·), respectively, and add the equation decsecret(encsecret(x, y), y) = x. By adding these symbols, interference with the other encryption and decryption symbols will be prevented. We now introduce a protocol secret(P) which is derived from P as follows: It first generates a new nonce n, used as a secret. It now behaves just as P. However, whenever P uses a term s as a key for encryption or decryption in the evaluation of a condition in an if-then-else statement or to output a message, then secret(P) outputs encsecret(n, s). Now, the second part of our symbolic criterion requires that, when executing secret(P), n can never be derived by the adversary, i.e., for every successor Q of secret(P), it holds that ϕ(Q) n. This exactly captures that all terms used as keys in P are symbolically secret, i.e., cannot be derived by the adversary. We say that P preserves key secrecy.
There are of course more declarative ways to formulate this condition. However, from the formulation above it is immediately clear that this condition can be checked automatically using existing tools, such as ProVerif. Now, we are ready to formulate the main theorem of this paper, a computational soundness result for universally composable key exchange. As explained above, the symbolic criterion that we use can be checked automatically using existing tools. The proof of this theorem is presented in Section 8.
Theorem 3. Let P be a symbolic protocol and let τ be an injective mapping of global constants to bit strings. If P preserves key secrecy and P ∼ l rand(P), then [|P|] τ ≤ F ke . τ (without Fenc) is a used-order respecting and non-committing protocol, then, by the composition theorem, we can replace Fenc by its realization Penc. However, we even obtain a stronger result where we do not have to assume that [|P|] τ is noncommitting:
Corollary 1. Let P and τ be as in Theorem 3. If P preserves key secrecy, P ∼ l rand(P), and [|P|] τ is usedorder respecting, then [|P|] τ Penc ≤ F ke . The condition that [|P|] τ is used-order respecting is not a symbolic one. However, there is a simple symbolic criterion which captures the notion of a standard protocol explained in Section 5.2.
Definition 6. We call a symbolic protocol P symbolically standard if in every symbolic trace of P no short-term key is encrypted by some other short-term key after it has been used for encryption.
It is not hard to see that this condition can be checked automatically using, for example, ProVerif: The condition can be encoded as a secrecy property where a secret is output to the adversary if the condition is violated. We note that decidability results for detecting key cycles in symbolic protocols were presented in [19] . We obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 2. Let P and τ be as in Theorem 3. If P preserves key secrecy, is symbolically standard, and satisfies P ∼ l rand(P), then [|P|] [26] , !Penc can be replaced by its joint state realization, in which the same long-term keys are used across all sessions. In such a realization session identifiers are encrypted along with the actual plaintexts.
Altogether, the above results show that if a protocol satisfies our symbolic criterion, which is concerned only with a single protocol session and can be checked automatically, then this protocol satisfies a strong, computational composability property for key exchange. In particular, it can be used as a key exchange protocol in every (probabilistic polynomial-time) environment and even if polynomially many copies of this protocol run concurrently. This merely assumes that an authenticated encryption scheme is used for symmetric encryption, which is a standard cryptographic assumption, and that session identifiers are added to plaintexts before encryption. The latter may not be done explicitly in all protocol implementations, although it is often done implicitly, e.g. in IPsec, and it is, in any case, a good design technique.
PROOF OF THE MAIN THEOREM
Throughout this section, we fix a symbolic protocol P = (νn)(c in net (x1). . . . .c in net (x l ).(R1 . . . R l )) that preserves key secrecy and satisfies P ∼ l rand(P). We also fix an injective mapping τ of global constants to bit strings and an environ-
τ the real system and by S ideal = E | Sim | F ke the ideal system.
We construct the simulator Sim as follows: Sim simulates the system [|P|] τ , where messages obtained from F ke (to start the key exchange for a party) are forwarded to the I/O interface of (the simulated system) [|P|] τ and all inputs from E are forwarded to the network interface of [|P|] τ . Network outputs of [|P|] τ are forwarded to E and I/O outputs of [|P|] τ which are SK-output messages (see Section 5.1), containing the exchanged session key, are forwarded as session finish messages to F ke . If some key or party in [|P|] τ gets corrupted, then Sim corrupts F ke . Recall that F ke is corruptible as long as no SK-output message has been sent.
To prove S ≡ S ideal , we first prove a so-called mapping lemma, which relates concrete traces to symbolic traces, similar to mapping lemmas in other works on computational soundness. The specific complication we need to deal with in our mapping lemma, unlike other mapping lemmas, is the delicate issue of dishonestly generated keys. For this, we use that P preserves key secrecy. (The property P ∼ l rand(P) is only used later to prove S ≡ S ideal .) We need a mapping lemma both for the system S and S ideal .
Mapping Lemmas. Roughly speaking, the mapping lemmas that we want to prove state that, with overwhelming probability, a concrete trace t of S and S ideal corresponds to a symbolic trace symb(t) of P and rand(P), respectively. A concrete trace of a system is given by the definition of runs in the IITM model.
To state the mapping lemmas more precisely, we need the following terminology. We say that a concrete trace is uncorrupted if no key in Fenc and no machine Mi is corrupted. A concrete trace is called non-colliding if it is uncorrupted and no collisions occur between nonces (including the session key output by F ke in case of S ideal ), global constants, and ciphertexts which were produced with unknown/uncorrupted keys (i.e., encryptions of the leakage of a message). It is easy to prove that the probability that a trace is colliding and uncorrupted is negligible.
Given a prefix t of a non-colliding concrete trace of S or S ideal (we consider both cases simultaneously), we recursively define a mapping ψt from bit strings to ground terms (not non-colliding concrete traces are taken care of separately). For this purpose, we fix an injective mapping Garbage : {0, 1} * → N of bit strings to names such that the names are distinct from all names in P/rand(P). The mapping ψt will be used to define the symbolic trace symb(t) corresponding to t.
1. ψt(m) := ψt(m1), ψt(m2) if m is a pair of the form m1, m2 for some bit strings m1, m2.
2. ψt(m) := sk(n) if m = (Key, k) where k ∈ {0, 1} * is a short-term key in Fenc and corresponds to the name n ∈ Nst, i.e., for this n some Mi asked Fenc, in the initialization phase, to generate a short-term key and this key, stored in Fenc, is k (where Mi only gets a pointer to this key). If k is not a short-term key in Fenc, then n := Garbage(m).
3. ψt(m) := n if m is the random bit string chosen by some
Mi for the nonce n ∈ Nnonce in t or if m = τ (n) for a global constant n. In case of S ideal , n is the name n * added by rand(P) if m is the session key chosen by F ke .
4. ψt(m) := {ψt(m )} r sk(n) if the plaintext/ciphertext pair (m , m) is recorded in Fenc for a (short-term or longterm) key and if the name corresponding to this key is n. The name r is the symbolic randomness of the symbolic ciphertext which was evaluated to m in t.
5. ψt(m) := Garbage(m) if none of the above cases are true.
One verifies that ψt is well-defined and injective, using our tagging convention and that t is non-colliding. We note that ψt maps ciphertexts not honestly generated, i.e., not contained in Fenc, to garbage. For this to make sense, we use in the proof of the mapping lemmas that P preserves key secrecy. Now, we use ψt to associate every prefix t of a non-colliding concrete trace with a symbolic trace symb(t). We note that symb(t) is only defined if every input provided by the adversary can be derived symbolically.
We say that a prefix t of a concrete trace of S or S ideal is Dolev-Yao (DY) if t is non-colliding and symb(t) is a symbolic trace (in the sense of Definition 1) of P or rand(P), respectively; in particular, symb(t) must be defined. Now, we can state the mapping lemma for S and S ideal .
Lemma 1. The probability that a concrete trace t of S is corrupted or t is DY is overwhelming (as a function of the security parameter). The same is true for S ideal .
Proof Sketch of Theorem 3. We can now prove that S ≡ S ideal by defining a correspondence relation between (almost) all concrete traces of S to the concrete traces of S ideal , where the final output of E is the same in corresponding traces.
The case when a concrete trace t of S is corrupted is trivial, since then Sim can corrupt F ke and mimic the concrete trace of S exactly. The case where in t no session key is output is also trivial. Otherwise, we use Lemma 1 and the assumption P ∼ l rand(P).
RELATED WORK
The general approach of this paper follows the one by Canetti and Herzog [14] . However, they consider only the simpler case of public-key encryption. Also, their symbolic criterion is based on patterns [2] , which is closely related to static equivalence, but more ad hoc.
Comon-Lundh and Cortier [15] show that observational equivalence implies computational indistinguishability for a class of protocols similar to the one considered here, but with more restricted if-then-else statements. The main drawback of their result is that it makes the unrealistic assumption that the adversary cannot fabricate keys, except for honestly running the key generation algorithm. In other words, dishonestly generated keys are disallowed, an assumption that we do not make. This is one of the reasons why their result does not imply our computational soundness result. Also, the approaches are different in that Comon-Lundh and Cortier consider a game-based setting, while we use simulation-based security and make intensive use of composability.
In [4] , Backes and Pfitzmann proposed a Dolev-Yao style abstraction of symmetric encryption within their cryptographic library [5] . In the full version of the work by ComonLundh and Cortier [16] , the authors pointed out that they do not know how the problem with dishonestly generated keys that they encountered is solved in the cryptographic library by Backes and Pfitzmann. Indeed it turns out that dishonestly generated keys also have to be forbidden for the cryptographic library, in case symmetric encryption is considered. Moreover, the realization of this library requires an authenticated encryption scheme which is augmented with extra randomness as well as identifiers for symmetric keys.
Mazaré and Warinschi [29] presented a mapping lemma for protocols that use symmetric encryption in a setting with adaptive, rather than only static corruption. However, the protocol class is very restricted: symmetric keys may not be encrypted, and hence, may not "travel", and nested encryption is disallowed.
In [20] , a formal logic that enjoys a computational, gamebased semantics is used to reason about protocols that use symmetric encryption. In [28, 10] , automated methods for reasoning about cryptographic protocols are proposed that are based on transformation of programs and games, and hence, are close to cryptographic reasoning. However, these works do not provide computationally sound symbolic criteria for reasoning about protocols.
As already mentioned in the introduction, computational soundness results for passive or adaptive adversaries have been obtain, for example, in [2, 22] .
